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13t
to maintain our position in the Colony. The increases are
necessary because of our withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia. For
example, we shall now need to have five minesweepers in Hong Kong
to do what two or three deployed from Singapore have done hitherto.
4. The consequences of withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia are
firstly that we shall have to base naval and air forces in the
Colony whereas we are at present able to provide the necessary
cover and backing by deployment from Singapore.
Secondly, reinfor-
cements will have to come from the United Kingdom, will take longer &
the periods involved will not meet the safety requirements in a
Colony where situations requiring our intervention can arise so
suddenly. Thirdly there is the question of maintaining the
morale of the local population upon which our whole position
depends: this is bound to droop as the process of withdrawal
brings home to Hong Kong its isolation. Finally we must not
overlook the effect on China's attitude towards the Colony of any
indication that we are not concerned to maintain our position there.
Permanent Fighter Presence
Et m
5. I share the Governor's view that there should be a permanent
fighter presence in Hong Kong. not a good military case for this. But the political arguments
are, I consider, strong and I have set them out in a letter to
the Defence Secretary.
It must be conceded that there is
6.
Take in A-4
A small fighter presence would have considerable value in
terms of sustaining public morale; in its absence, the effect of
a Chinese intrusion into Hong Kong air space would be catastrophic.
There has been a tendency here to write off the possibility of
intrusion because there has been none in the years since the
communists came to power. I do not think we should regard the
risk too lightly. The Governor mentioned to me that in 1955
Formosan military aircraft intruded into Hong Kong air space; any
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