TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 94

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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Mr. Hall

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BRIEF FOR MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STAFF

at 2.45 p.m. on THURSDAY, 21 MARCH, 1968

100

D.P.9/68 (Final): FUTURE DEFENCE POLICY HONG KONG GARRISON

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The Threat

This section of the Report is based on the recent J.I.C.

assessment. There was some disposition among the planners to depart from it; compare General Carver's somewhat gloomy report on the future economic situation at the C.O.S. meeting on 12 March.

This

was resisted by myself and the representative of Defence Intelligence Staff.

Chiefs of Staff may refer to General Carver's comments. The

point he made came up at the meeting last week; in essence it is that Chinese attempts to channel their trade direct to other countries, avoiding Hong Kong, could seriously damage the Colony's economy and reduce Chinese dependence on it. I pointed out that even if this was an aim of Chinese policy (which I doubted) it affected an insignificant sector of Hong Kong's trade.

The loss of this trade

We have only 1966 trade figures in sufficient detail to quantify this sector. In 1966 Hong Kong domestic exports were $5,730m. and re-exports 81,833m. a total of $7,563m. About $600m. of the re-exports were goods of Chinese origin. rould be of no great significance to the Hong Kong economy; but it does represent about 22% of Chinese earnings of foreign exchange through visible trade with Hong Kong (approximately $2,700m. in 1966). However, we have seen little hard evidence that China is making a serious attempt to divert this trade (although at the height of

confrontation, when China was trying to represent that the port was paralysed, some steps were clearly taken to avoid sending Chinese goods through Hong Kong) All our present information is that China's policy is to maximise its use of Hong Kong's econom potential. The decline in Hong Kong's trade with China during 1967 seems to be due more to dislocation in China than to deliberate policy decisions.

Level of Forces in 1971

The recommended level of forces by the end of 1971 is set out

(An erratum slip has issued correcting the

in paragraph 41(g).

number of MCMs. from two to five).

levels are satisfactory.

From our point of view the

/ Generally

...

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