TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 91

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Reference......

(102)

Ar. Gammarc

As at X

While I was still reading the paper for the Chief of Staff I was told that the Chiefs of Staff were taking the paper today and by the time I reached the Chiefs of Staff meeting most of the paper had been discussed and this discussion related primarily to the proposed amendments in the sheets below. The C.0.S. were a little concerned about the mention of a requirement of 10 major units for Hong Kong and I understood from the discussion that a suggestion had been made and agreed that the mention of 10 should be omitted from the paper but that arrangements should be made for pre-stocked unit equipment to be retained in Hong Kong to enable reinforcements beyond the 7 major units to be flown out to Hong Kong at short notice.

At the conclusion of the discussion I apologised for my late arrival and said that, broadly speaking, the level of forces proposed in the paper was acceptable to us but that I personally found it difficult to accept the argument that, as there was no military justification for the fighter aircraft presence, their costs should be regarded as separate. In my view, it had been accepted that in the event of serious aggression by the Chinese we could not defend Hong Kong and there was little difference between the Military, Navy or R.A.F. presence. They were all required to identify aggression and act as a deterrent to it, but that we had accepted that they could not prevent it if the Chinese were determined to attack Hong Kong.

I also said that I did not think there could be question of asking Hong Kong to pay an additional contribution at this stage. The current contribution of £4.5 million plus some local services would run until March, 1971, and I thought that Hong Kong would argue that, having agreed that after two special visits by the Colonial Secretary, any change in their contributions would have to wait until the present contribution came up for review some time before March, 1971.

I understood the Chiefs of Staff to accept my view that it was not for them to decide who should pay any extra costs, though they on their part were entitled to suggest that the cost should not fall on the Ministry of Defence budget.

Incidentally I understood from General McNeill that he knew several days ago that the meeting was to take place this afternoon and he understood that a copy of the agenda for the meeting had in fact been sent across to Curtis Green.

We should await minutes of the meeting and if they do not contain my reservations about the extra costs of aircraft we should ask for amendments to be made.

سیما

2013

P.S. You will see some

to the paper

in Cos

12/2013

NPH (H.P. Hall)

20 March, 1968

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