TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 40

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ANNEX A TO COS 1252/5/4/68 (Continued)

23.

b.

(2) By 1975 there would be an annual foreign exchange and budgetary saving of £n1.3 and a saving of capital expenditure in Hong Kong of £n6.08 part of which might be net by the Hong Kong Government. This would, however, be offset by a loss of receipts from the sale of accommodation in the UK of £m6.6.

Disadvantages

(1) There would be a great increase in turbulence throughout the Army, with consequential

adverse effects on unit morale and efficiency, and on recruiting and re-engagements.

(2) The large increase in unaccompanied service could cause a serious loss of morale among narried servicemen, who fill most key appoint- ments, and their families, who would face a series of additional moves.

(3) The decision would be hard to explain to the Army, which has recently faced a series of unpalatable decisions, particularly in view of the manifest lessening of terrorism in Hong Kong compared with 1967, when all units had their families with them.

(4) Once taken, it would be extremely difficult later to reverse the decision and reintroduce accompanied service in Hong Kong.

Until 1972 the Army could garrison Hong Kong with un- accompanied British units without serious difficulty. Once the Gurkha rundown and the British Army rundown completed a much more difficult situation would arise.

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were

24.

If absolutely necessary the Army could garrison Hong Kong during the mid-seventies on a mainly unaccompanied basis as proposed by CINCFE. The change would however bring with it turbulence and family separation even if no unforeseen commitments presented themselves, and if such commitments naterialized the turbulence would be increased. This would further reduce the effectiveness of units in Europe which would already be carrying the burden of gaps in the order of battle on account of handover problems. Extra family stations would have to be provided in the UK, and there would be other disadvantages, none in themselves insuperable, but all adding up to a burden which a volunteer Army would have great difficulty in sustaining at the force levels planned for the seventies.

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