TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 166

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C) (Draft) (Continued)

to avoid the disadvantages attendant on serious economic

decline or collapse.

f. A policy of moderation could quickly be reversed,

particularly if the Cultural Revolution flared up again

with a resurgence of extremism, although at present this

seems unlikely. But if it did, it could create a

heightened danger of direct action against Hong Kong

either deliberately, or by miscalculation.

The danger

of direct action might also apply if the economic

importance of Hong Kong to China declined.

g. One factor Peking will have in mind is that any British decision to reduce the size of the garrison, coupled with the accelerated withdrawal of the British military presence from the Far East, could, in due course, have an acute

effect on local and in particular police morale and thus

on the position of the Hong Kong Government.

Royal Navy

5.

PRESENT FORCE LEVELS AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The present forces to meet current tasks are:

a. One frigate, reinforced by an additional frigate from

the Far East Command in times of tension, to give added support to maritime police patrols and to act as a deterrent to Chinese Communist Navy interference and local piracy. This ship also constitutes the United Kingdom naval contri- bution to the United Nations Command in South Korea. b. Two mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels, on rotation from Singapore, reinforced by two additional vessels in times of tension for direct support of maritime police patrols to prevent the free influx of refugees by sea and to contribute to the control of piracy and smuggling.

A - 3

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