TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 144

UK EYES ONLY

SECRET

Part I to COS 16th Meeting/68 12th March 1968

reasons, some of which had been mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, as to why the rundown could not be accelerated.

We

b. Ministers have stated that planning for the withdrawal of our forces both from the Far East and the Persian Gulf must be as flexible as possible. Flexibility could only be considered in the context of earlier withdrawals since once facilities had been given up it would not be possible to delay the with- drawal of a particular unit or facility. This point was coupled to the long term intentions of HMG. would soon be obliged to take part in Five Power Talks with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, and for these talks to have any chance of success we would have to be able to make a tangible offer to assist the other countries concerned in the setting up of a defence of the area after we had left. The defence and consequent stability of Malaysia and Singapore, could depend, to a large extent, on an Australian presence. The Australians were greatly concerned at the cost of the facilities which would have to be maintained in Singapore and Malaysia to support any forces that they, and the New Zealanders, might have there. It was therefore important that we created a climate in which Australia would feel able to retain forces in Singapore and Malaysia.

In discussion of the paper (5), the following further points were made:

C. There were no difficulties, logistically, in withdrawing simultaneously from the Gulf and the Far East, provided our forces were not engaged in operations in either area at the time. There appeared, at present, to be no external threat to Malaysia and Singapore but since our final withdrawal would be some four years ahead, the outcome of the Vietnam war would be a significant factor. AS regards internal unrest, it was difficult to predict what the situation would be, but any difficulties would be more likely to occur after we had left.

ã•

It was important to our interests in the area that there should be stability not only during, but after our withdrawal and in this context the question of a military presence of Australia and New Zealand forces in Malaysia and Singapore was important. present, neither country had committed itself.

At

Note:

5. DOP 4/68.

3 SECRET

UK EYES ONLY