f.
SECRET
UK EYES ONLY
ANNEX A to DP 9/68 (Final) (Continued)
One factor Peking will have in mind is that any British decision to reduce the size of the garrison, coupled with the accelerated withdrawal of the British military presence from the Far East, could in due course
have an acute effect on local and in particular police
morale, and thus on the position of the Hong Kong Government.
Royal Navy
5.
PRESENT FORCE LEVELS AND CONCEFT OF OPERATIONS
The present forces to meet current tasks are:
a. One frigate, reinforced by an additional frigate
from the Far East Command in times of tension, to give added support to maritime police patrols and to act as a deterrent to Chinese Communist Navy interference and local piracy. This ship also constitutes the United
Kingdom naval contribution to the United Nations Command
in South Korea.
b. Two mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels, on rotation
from Singapore, reinforced by two additional vessels in times of tension for direct support of maritime police patrols to prevent the influx of refugees by sea and to contribute to the control of piracy and smuggling.
C.
Limited shore support facilities at HMS TAMAR.
The remainder of the Far East Fleet, based on Singapore, is available for reinforcement of the Hong Kong garrison.
Army
6
The present force of 7% major units, which includes one reinforcing infantry battalion as a temporary measure, is justified by a concept of operations which provides the capability to contain an internal security situation. This in turn is linked to our ability to control the frontier, and to prevent the situation being aggravated by an influx of large numbers of infiltrators or refugees. To fail in this would, apart from other consequences, present the Chinese with a pretext for
military intervention.
SECRET
A
3
UK EYES ONLY
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