TNAG-0059-FCO40-95-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 99

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DP NOTE 27/67(A) (Flimsy Draft)(Continued)

the threat to Hong Kong, the reduction of force levels in the

Far East and the necessity for Hong Kong to be autonomous in

1970/71.

11. The ability of the Commander-in-Chief to continue to

provide roulement forces, in the light of the other National

commitments, including the reinforcement of Hong Kong in an

emergency, will be difficult. However, although the two Gurkha

battalions, (reducing to one in 1971), and the two Commando

battalions may be required to fulfill National commitments, there

is no reason why these units should not remain written into the

reinforcement plan for Hong Kong. On the other hand, the

planned rundown of the Brigade of Gurkhas, now complicated by the

views of the Government of Nepal (10), in that they view with

equanimity the future of the Brigade of Gurkhas, may well

exacerbate the problem.

Army Garrison in the Mid-Seventies

12.

The Commander-in-Chief has assumed that by the mid-Seventies

the Gurkha rundown will be complete and the garrison will consist

of United Kingdom troops only. He states that the bulk of these

troops must be unaccompanied on the grounds that in the event of

internal security troubles, families in such numbers would not be

acceptable. He further states that he supports the recommen-

dation of both the Governor and the Commander British Forces

Hong Kong that, as combat units reliefs take place in the future,

they should change to unaccompanied tours, although the battalion

on Hong Kong Island and the static units and headquarters would

remain accompanied. The Governor does not envisage that such a

policy would affect the confidence of the colony if it was

introduced in this manner.

13. These proposals raise a fundamental new precept in the

respect of overseas tours, which may have scrious implications

for the Army as a whole, and they could set a precedent affecting

other Services and civilian families on a matter which you have

already treated as of great concern (11). The main implications

Notes:

10.

Katmandu to FO 141, dated 17.7.67. 11. PPO 33/67, PAO 27/67, COS 29th tg 67.

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