TNAG-0059-FCO40-95-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 47

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Hoa ng

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Me are directly responsible for Hong Kong which. as a population of some 4 million, of whom 2 million are 6.K. and Colony citizens. The role of the garrison in Hong Kong is to identify aggression, but its main role is to maintain internal security. In 1966 the 2.0.2.0. agreed to reduce the garrison to 53 major units, but because of the disturbances in Hong Kong which began in May this year and the confrontation with China it was decided in September this year to retain the garrison at 63 major units and in fact it was re-inforced from in apore by an additional battalion, making 73 major units.

2. Under the previous planning it had been agreed that when the Singapore Base was run down the Hong Kong garris:n should be of the order of 73 major units plus Naval and Air Forces.

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3. The vulnerability of the Colony to pressures from China and from local Communists shows that the internal security situation can become extremely serious.

This year in une because of almost continuous demonstrations, the Police Force were very nearly completely exhausted. Military forces have not been called in in a purely internal security role but they have assisted the Police in scaling of areas for police action,

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With the run-down of the Singapore base it will be even more difficult to move troops to Hong Dong for internal security purposes at a future date.

5. Hong Kong nakes a defence contribution to the coat of maintaining the British grison of some £5m. a year, but alco spends some 13% of its annual expenditure on defence and internal security measures including the local defence forces

Hong Tong has been considerably hit by the recent devaluation and has lost some 25. through its sterling balances held in London.

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7. The minimum strength required for an internal security role in Hong Kong is 53 major units. The removal of the garrison me proposed by the Foreign Office rely ancunts to a decision to give up liong Kong altogether.

8. The implicati no of giving up Hong Kong would be far- reaching. Apart from our own considerable financial interest in the Colony the political implications to our allies, particularly the Americans, could be enormous and the effect throughout South-East Asia would be extremely damaging. This action would be regarded by the United States and by the Commonwealth countries in the eres se totally irresponsible at the prevent time.