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ANNEX A TO COS 1081/2/2/68
SAVING DESPATCH
From the Governor, Hong Kong
To the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs
Repeated to:-
Repeated to:-
Date...27th December, 1967.....
•
My Reference...TSX.1/57..
Your Reference
*
No...709..
No
•
No......
FIGHTERS FOR HONG KONG
1. When the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, visited Hong Kong in October, both the Commander British Forces and I drew his special attention to the undesirability of leaving Hong Kong without a fighter presence. This arose particularly in the context of the increasing difficulties in maintaining, with the new generation of fighters, the regular visits at present carried out by Javelins and Hunters.
2. After his visit to London at the end of October, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East informed me that, although the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff did not react favourably to the suggestion that fighters should again be stationed in Hong Kong permanently, the Ministry of Defence (Air) would examine the problem.
3.
I am aware of the military arguments against having fighters here; nevertheless I would like to set out my own reasons for believing that, in spite of these, every effort should be made to keep a fighter prosence here.
4. Confidence. A fighter presence in Hong Kong is a visible commitment by the United Kingdom in support of the Colony, and this is evidence which sustains confidence in Her Majesty's Government's intention to maintain its position here.
If we
were denied this presence, it would be interpreted as an abandon- ment of a degree of United Kingdom support and weakening of this intention.
5. Practicability of Interception. I am aware that, in practice, defending fighter aircraft would have little or no chance of carrying out interceptions in Colony air space. I know, too, that it has been argued in the past that even if interceptions could be made, the few fighters which we had would easily be overwhelmed. Nevertheless, I believe that the absence of fighters cannot but provide a strong and continual temptation to the CPG to fly over the Colony, and possibly to make leaflet raids, as a means of applying pressure and of demonstrating their support for their "compatriots". It also seems to me that there is a great uifference between a situation in which any Chinese aircraft could cruise in Hong Kong air space at will, and one in which they would have to take account of the risks of becoming engaged, with the attendant international repercussions. I believe that the value of even a very few fighters in situations elsewhere very similar to Hong Kong's has, in fact, been demonstrated in the past.
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