TNAG-0059-FCO40-95-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 23

(P

ET/115/8-11

FROM: J. . Mayne

DS8

81

Page 1 of 2 pages

SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.I

Telephone: weba k 1702xxear

01-930-7022 ext. 6214

Our reference: DS8/24 66

Your referenc

Dear Gaminar

(69)

Y

February 1968

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR HONG KONG

1. We have spoken on several occasions over the past day or so about the Saving Telegram No 709 from the Governor of Hong Kong, dated 27th December 1967, in which he advanced a political case for stationing fighter aircraft permanently in Hong Kong.

The purpose of this letter is to ask you for the Commonwealth Office's considered view on the Governor's aespatch, so that we can reach a decision on whether we should re-examine the implications of stationing fighter aircraft in Hong Kong as part of an exercise, which we shall shortly be undertaking, on the long term policy for the defence of Hong Kong, including the size of the garrison.

2.

You are, of course, fully aware of the fact that we consider that there is no military case for stationing a flight of fighter aircraft in Hong Kong, and I note that the Governor now thinks so too. The four Hunters were withdrawn from Hong Kong at the ena of 1966, as a result of the Defence Review economies or that year, during which it was recognised that the main task of the Hunters was maintaining the integrity of Hong Kong airspace; and that the capability for rapid air reinforcement, as demonstrated in periodic exercises, should prove a sufficient deterrent against violation of Hong Kong airspace. This view has been more recently re-affirmed by the Defence Planning Staff who reported to the Chiefs of Staff, following the receipt of CINCFE's telegram number SACOS 153, that the operational effectiveness of fighters in Hong Kong was influenced by local limitations in the control and reporting facilities; operational shortcomings of Kai Tak airfields; limitations imposed by weather and terrain; and the lack of a diversion airfield. They therefore questioned the military value even of the occasional detachments which we provide to Hong Kong. They did, however, recognise that there might be overriding political reasons for deploying fighters to Hong Kong from time to time.

3. In the light of this, if there is to be a case for stationing fighter aircraft permanently in Hong Kong, whether in the period up to 1971 or afterwards it will have to rest in first instance on the extent to which you are prepared to press the arguments set out by the Governor in his Despatch. We would of course be opposed to fighter aircraft being stationed in or detached to Hong Kong in the long term, partly because of the lack of any military case which of itself undermines their political value, and partly because we are never likely to have spare capacity in the Royal Air Force for taking on for political reasons tasks which are militarily unsound unless

A. W. Gaminara Esq.

Hon, Kong Dept

Commonwealth Office

Curtis Green Building.

Copy to: D. A. Campbell Esq.

Defence Dept

Commonwealth Office S. X 1.

/these