2.
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10.
ANNEX A to DP Note 27/67(A) (Flimsy Draft) (Continued
b. We could provide the backing for the armoured car
squadron and the light regiment from our planned force
levels but it would mean using units of 3 Division and
reducing our capability to meet limited war/internal
security commitments. The alternative is to increase
our planned force levels by an armoured reconnaissance
regiment and three light regiments in the manner described
at paras 7.b.(1) and 7.b.(2) above.
C. We could provide the backing for the unaccompanied
British battalion from our planned force levels by using
the three battalions which would have gone to Hong Kong
to replace Gurkhas.
a.
We stop the Gurkha rundown at about 6,000 to provide
a field squadron and four battalions in Hong Kong.
e. We could disband the British field squadron due to
replace the Gurkha squadron in 1973.
Summary
a.
Unless we increase cur long term force levels to meet
the Hong Kong deployment as proposed by the Commander-in-
Chief, we shall very seriously reduce our capability to
meet the assumed limited war/internal security commitments.
B
•
The major implicaticns of the proposal fall upon the
Infantry and its ability to meet overseas commitments.
These implications can only be eliminated if:
(1) under Course A, we keep all the sixteen
battalions we plan to disband between now and
1976, and delay the replacement of Gurkhas in
Hong Kong until the Persian Gulf commitment ends
in 1975. If we don't do the latter, there will
be a critical period in 1974/75 when we shall have
to back five unaccompanied battalions in Hong Kong
and two in the Persian Gulf concurrently.
A
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