TNAG-0058-FCO40-94-Armed-Forces-exercise-Caricature-1967 — Page 50

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3.

As Mr. Hopson points out, the Chinese leadership might

welcome another foreign diversion. There could also be

a spontaneous reaction by local Chinese in Hong Kong or

Red Guards in the neighbouring Chinese provinces, which

Peking would find it difficult to discountenance, even

if they wanted to do so.

The Governor of Hong Kong is clearly in two minds about

the advisability of allowing the exercise to proceed.

He agrees

he says that he

that it could cause serious difficulties;

would have been far happier if it had not been planned and that,

if a decision had to be taken now, he would almost certainly

have to advise cancellation as being the only safe course.

The Governor also, however, puts the arguments for allowing the

exercise to proceed under certain conditions (paragraph 9 of

his telegram No. 153). With respect, I suggest that the first

condition is unacceptable: to stop the exercise after it starts,

presumably under Chinese pressure, would be to give the latter

another "outstanding victory" after Macao.

Also we do not see

how we could guarantee, as the Governor implies, that publicity

should be strictly confined. As regards the third condition,

even if the narrative is not disclosed, the nature of the

exercise would be fairly obvious. The Governor also suggests

that we can afford to wait a little longer before deciding to

cancel. There must now be very few days to go before preliminary

developments take place and we cannot see the relevant factors

changing materially before then.

5. This question was considered by the Chiefs of Staff when

discussing Ching on 10 January (Mr. Brooke-Turner's minute of

Neither the Foreign Office nor, I understand, the

Flag C

1 February).

/Commonwealth