TNAG-0058-FCO40-94-Armed-Forces-exercise-Caricature-1967 — Page 46

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5.

ANNEX A TO COS 1098/3/2/67 (Concluded)

C. The Chinese will in any case know of the exercise and become aware of its nature. In commenting on likely Chinese reactions in his telegram No 142, Hopson accepts that we might get away with it provided there is no American participation. However, he gives reasons for concluding also that the risk of a violent Chincse reaction cannot be excluded. We consider that there is a very real risk that the Chinese would regard a large military exercise of this nature in Hong Kong at this time as a military provocation and that they would react violently to it. The present cxtreme phase of the Cultural Revolution, the recent successful pressure exerted on the Portuguese in Macao and the fierce action now being taken by the Chinese in Peking against foreign Embassies and their personnel (including the French) support this view. As Hopson points out, the Chinese leadership might welcome another foreign diversion. There could also be a spontaneous reaction by local Chinese in Hong Kong or Red Guards in the neighbouring Chinese provinces, which Peking would find it difficult to discountenance, even if they wanted to do so.

The Governor is clearly in two minds. He agrees that the exercise could cause serious difficulties; he says that he would have been far happier if it had not been planned and that, if a decision had to be taken now, he would almost certainly have to advise cancellation as being the only safe course. He suggests that the exercise might proceed under certain conditions set out in his paragraph 9, but I am sorry to say that these conditions do not seem to us desirable or practicable. The first is unacceptable: to stop the exercise after it starts could be interpreted only as capitulation under Chinese pressure, and would be to give Peking another "outstanding victory", following that in Macao. The second condition, that pr licity be strictly confined is unfortunately impossible in the circumstances envisaged. As regards the third condition, even if the narrative is not disclosed, the nature of the exercise would be obvious. The Governor also suggests that we can afford to wait a little longer before deciding to cancel. Thore must now be very few days to go before preliminary deployment takes place and we cannot see the relevant factors changing materially before then.

6.

Bearing in mind the grave risk of this exercise provoking a serious Chinese reaction, we do hope that the Chiefs of Staff will agree to cancelling the exercise. If they do not feel able to do this we are sure that a decision on the exercise would have to be taken by Ministers.

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