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after it starts could be interpreted only as capitulation under Chinese pressure, and would be to give Peking another "outstanding victory", following that in Macao. The second condition, that publicity be strictly confined, is unfortunately impossible in the circumstances envisaged. `s regarda the third condition, even if the narrative 18 not disclosed, the nature of the exercise would be obtious. The Governor also suggests that we can afford to wait a little longer before deciding to cancel. There must now be very few days to go before preliminary deployment takes place and we cannot see the relevant factors changing materially before then.
6.
Bearing in mind the grave risk of this exercise provoking a serious Chinese reaction, we do hope that the Chiefs of Staff will agree to cancelling the exercise. If they do not feel able to do this we are sure that a decision on the exercise would have to be taken by Ministers.
7. a a parenthesis it looks as if there has been some failure of communication between all those concerned.
will look into it here, and perhaps you and Galsworthy, would
do the BARO. We might then compare the results next week.
8. I am copying this letter, without enclosure to Major General Gibbon in the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat and Sir Arthur Galsworthy in the Commonwealth office.
(J.0. Rennie)
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