TNAG-0056-FCO40-92-Evacuation-plan-1967 — Page 152

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

(97757)

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(i.e. Military assistance with notification and

movement of evacuees would be possible).

(2) to provide the necessary security of emplaning and

and embarkation points.

C. This operation would have to take priority over any other military operation requiring the use of air transport forces

and H Ships of the Far East fleet. However, from October 1967 until the spring of 1968 a large proportion of the Far East Fleet is likely to be committed to the withdrawal from Aden and operations in support of South Arabia after

independence.

Numbers to be evacuated (to be included by Commonwealth Office)

5.

Concept of Operations

6.

General. Hi Ships would be able to embark evacuees from with- in the harbour area, and if necessary use the beaches on the south side of Hong Kong Island if the harbour was not available. Art- craft from RAF Air Support Command and FEAF would be able to move evacuees from KaiTak to Changi.

7.

Forces to be employed.

a. The Far East Fleet, if not committed elsewhere, could provide a lift of up to 12,000.

b. Up to the following number of aircraft from RAF Air

Support Command and Far East Air Force could be made available, based on existing forces:

15 Britannia

6 VC 10

5 Belfast

8 Argosy

6 Beverley

With this force it should be possible to move initially up to 5000/day in approximately 48 sorties, or approximately 73,000 in 21 days. Certain elements of the above force will be changing, and there would be a continuing improvement in the lift capability,

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