TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 97

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64. The above figures are, at this stage, possible orders of magnitude only;

but the estimated annual outlay on all forms of mitigating assistance is the

best guess we can make at present of the amount we shall find it necessary to

give, and it will of course taper away over a period. It must, finally, be

emphasised that these figures are broad estimates only and the achievement of

the savings depends on determination to see them through in the face of the

many difficulties that will inevitably arise.

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SUMMARY

65. We were instructed to examine the consequences of a decision to be taken

by the middle of the year, to reduce our forces in Singapore and Malaysia by

about half by 1970-71 and to leave altogether by 1975-76. The speed and

manner in which the reductions can be implemented will require the successful

conclusion of the consultations with our allies, and depend on the impact of

our reductions on local economies and the reorganisation of our own forces.

Further examination is required before it is possible to specify in detail

the force levels resulting from the new policy in the Far East in 1970-71 or

1975-76; but it will be possible to have available a broad indication of

future force levels by the time a public statement of policy is made.

66. However, the initial proposal would be that by 1970-71 our main presence

in Singapore and Malaysia would be with maritime and air forces, land-based

forces having been withdrawn except for some Gurkhas. Conventional and

nuclear strike forces would not be stationed in the theatre. The forces we

might maintain in Australia after complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia would be limited to very small naval forces (it would be for decision later whether there should be an amphibious component) and a very small number

of aircraft.

67. In consequence force declarations to SEATO plans will have to be

progressively reduced, starting this year. Our contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade will be withdrawn during 1969-70. Any land forces

required for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore will have to be found from

reinforcements; by 1970-71 there will be insufficient stockpiles of

equipment for such reinforcements and they could not be effective in operations

for three months. Naval and air forces will be insufficient for a major

operation without reinforcement from west of Suez. Before 1970-71 we shall

have to secure an understanding with Malaysia and Singapore that our treaty

obligation would be limited to the presence of maritime and air forces, and

that land forces could not be guaranteed for major operations in under

three months. By 1975-76 any force contribution to SEATO will have to be on

an "if available" basis and our treaty obligations will have to have been

further modified.

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