TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 94

Defence Aid

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55. We are certain to be pressed by both Malaysia and Singapore for aid to

assist them to build up their defence forces. This question may well loom large even in the first round of consultations with Malaysia and Singapore on

the reduction of our forces, and could prove to be one of the most difficult

and contentious issues. Our response to their requests will depend to a

large degree on how the consultations as a whole develop, and we cannot therefore settle in advance the detail of our negotiating position. case, the question of defence aid raises wide issues which cannot be fully discussed here but needs separate study, which should be put in train as soon

as possible by the relevant Committee.

THE

In any

56. Our consideration of requests from Malaysia and Singapore for defence aid must begin from the fact that in the past we have borne the main burden of defending both Malaysia and Singapore against external aggression. It is undeniable that as we reduce and withdraw our forces in the area they will

need to make some increase in the size of their own armed forces, though there is room for more than one view on the extent and nature of the build up required. It is therefore inevitable that both countries will look primarily to us for aid for this purpose. While they have a legitimate need to build up their defence forces as a protection against external aggression and it is in line with our policy of encouraging indigenous military strength that they should do so their wish to increase their armed forces is also in part influenced by fear of one another, and there is a risk (as there has been on a larger scale, with India and Pakistan) that they will use against one another defence forces built up with aid from this country. The question therefore arises how far we can and if so how far we should seek to prevent this situation from arising. One possibility is international action to seek to deny offensive weapons to both countries: but past experience suggests that there is little chance of success for an operation of this kind. Secondly, the possibility exists of making it a condition of the grant of economic aid that the two countries should limit the quantity and character of their arms purchases: again there are serious doubts on both the

appropriateness and the effectiveness of this form of pressure.

If these

two policies are rejected, the question arises how much we are prepared to devote in defence aid to the two countries, and whether we can extend defence aid in such a way as to influence the two countries, towards building up a common defence effort rather than towards acquiring separately weapons which they might use against one another. Pending detailed study of these questions we cannot set any figure on the amount of defence aid that might be involved; it is relevant that earlier discussions with the two countries about defence aid indicated that defence equipment for Malaysia to counter balance the reduction in our forces stationed in the area might cost at least £50 million, while for Singapore, whose armed forces are still rudimentary, the cost might come to £25 million. It would be prudent to make allowance for suns of that order in considering the total aid which we may be called upon to provide.

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