TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 72

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timing and conditions of budgetary and military aid and of aid for development that it will be right to offer Singapore/Malaysia cannot

be adequately assessed except after full discussion with those Governments; the strength and direction of the reaction of our allies can only be broadly estimated at this stage; and the degree to which we may think it desirable to offer aid to other countries in the area (including Nepal)

as a contribution to general stability can be assessed only in the long

term. Our recommendations are consequently directed primarily to the

initial round of consultations with our allies.

2. The report is directed to the consequences of a decision, to be taken by the middle of the year, to halve our forces in Singapore/ Malaysia by 1970-71 and to withdraw from the mainland of Asia (apart from Hong Kong) no later than 1975-76. To achieve these reductions

most effectively, the process of consultation with our allies must be

seen to be genuine; within this framework, we should adapt the details

of our reduced military dispositions and our aid to the best mutual advantage, and by securing their agreement, or at least acquiescence, facilitate the process of carrying out these reductions, including all possible economies which we can make in our defence expenditure in the short-term. We must not therefore start from a position in which we

appear to have a firm and dated plan for phased withdrawal irrespective

of the views of our allies, since this would merely invite concerted

pressure on us to modify it to our disadvantage and there are many means by which they could hamper the process to our political embarrassment and financial cost. We must also recognise that however

we may seek to ensure that the substance of our consultations is not

publicised, most of it is certain to become known at a very early stage, but nevertheless we should do everything possible to avoid undue publicity particularly early in the consultation process.

3. Our starting point in the discussions should therefore be to state

our proposal to reduce our forces in the Far East with the aim of reducing our forces in Singapore/Malaysia by about half by 1970-71. This should be presented in such a way as not to impede the continuation of our rundown below defence review force levels, which will be reached in October this year. We should say that, as we saw it, it would be reasonable to plan on the assumption that we should have withdrawn wholly from those two countries by about the mid-1970s. We were consulting our allies so that after taking their views and interests into account

we should be in a position to take final decisions by the middle of this year as part of a general determination of our defence policy and deployment.

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