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and it was important to distinguish between this and a government planning assumption. He and his colleagues were, however, very anxious to learn Malaysia's reactions.
6. Tun Razak said that he was not worried by the position in the next twelve months, or up to 1970/71, but he was very concerned about the longer term situation. The position in South East Asia was vory fluid and it could develop in any direction. He was still worried about the situation in Indonesia and it was impossible to foresee what changes and reactions there might be there. It would be important to avoid announcing any decision about the longer term intentions or taking a final decision about it now. It would be much better to proceed on the course up to 1970 and see how matters stood at that date. The position should be kept flexible.
To make any announcement now about the longer term would upset the balance of power in the area and encourage instability. He hoped that Mr. Healey would stress these views very strongly to his colleagues. Dr. Lim Swee Aun supported Tun Razak strongly and asked whether the British Government had it in mind to drop out of the area entirely and, perhaps, pass its interests to the United States. Mr. Healey said that the first point he should make was that he did not think there was any possibility of the United States taking over these interests. There was a real need for the British Government to make some planning assumptions about the longer term. But Britain had a continuing interest in the stability and prosperity of the area. He recognised that the situation was a changing one and that he was talking about a long time ahead. Nevertheless it was important that we should think ahead. Increasingly the countries of Asia were standing on their own feet economically and militarily, particularly so far as land forces were concerned, though he would not dispute they would need to feel assured of assistance in the event of a major threat to their security.
7. Dr. Lim said that Malaysia was still interested in Asian groupings and was continuing to work towards them, but even 10 years would be too short a time for countries like Malaysia to stand on their own feet without some guarantee of help in the event of a major attack. He thought that Britain should adopt a flexible approach and certainly there should be no question of a public announcement; this could only be extremely damaging. 8. Mr. Healey said that he was grateful to the Malaysian Ministers for their reactions which he would convey to his colleagues. He re-emphasised that no decisions had been taken including, in particular, the question of what should be said in public. He could not give any undertaking about how this particular decision would be handled and there was much hard work to be done before decisions could be reached. He hoped, however, that within a few weeks we should be able to consult the Malaysians about our plans for our further reductions within the next twelve months and that it
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/might
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