CINCTE.1511/6130/18
TOP SECRET
UK EYES ONLY
Our present support of the local economy keeps undesirable pressures down. To avoid creating a power vacuum, a neáns must be found of integrating Singapore into a regional grouping, of which it could be the commercial but not the political centre of gravity, and which would be big enough to contain Singapore as well as to give its young population scope for their talents without threatening the other racos. This was the idea of Halaysia, but it was too hastily forced together and so failed. The next attempt should be by local ̧
The British initiative, and would take a long time to bring about. presence provides time for this to be achieved and was no doubt behind Ir Leo's reaction. If the British go it is liable to precipitate chaos.
h.
The COLDER-IN-CHIEF, in summing up, said:-
Short Term Reductions
(1)
(2)
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In the short term:-
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(2) Navy. Roductions were tied to the Beira Patrol and the possible Aden commitment.
(b) Army. Even if political decisions could be made in the near future the financial savings in the year ending April 1968 wore likely to be marginal.
(0) RAF. It is possible that savings could be nado by stopping the arrival of certain now aircraft, for instance the CH Squadron, and returning other such as elements of the SRT force.
It was highly desirable that all future planning and reductions should be tailored to fit in with an orderly rundown to the 50% target.
Variations in the 50% Reductions
(3) The C-in-C said that the long torm ain would clearly affect the mix for and the means of achieving the 50 target, of
He wore we to retain a capability in Singapore beyond 1975? stressed the importance of consulting with the Australians and New Zealanders who were closely affected by any reductions, and as examples he quoted Butterworth and the Commonwealth Brigade at Terendak.
(4)
Including CDS's, there are four options open to us if wo wish to retain some sort of SMITO commitment until 1970/71.
(5)
In opposition to CDS's guidelines, there are three options:-
(a) hintaining the Infantry Battalion in the Common- wealth Brigade while keeping only one Commando in 3 Comando Brigado.
(b) Maintaining the Infantry Battalion in the Common- wealth Brigade and two Commandos in the Commando Brigade but economising elsewhere.
(c) Assigning one Commando to the Commonwealth Brigado,
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