TOP SECRET
CINCFE.1511/6130/18
UK EYES ONLY
covered the need for commend, communications and provost staffs, weapons and aircraft serving teans, medical and other family services, and accommodation and recreational facilities for the Floot. Reductions in this uniformed section of 1,400 non would depend upon such things as rationalisation of communications and other services and the general pruning attendant upon any rundown. In reducing the main civilian part of the base the first cuts must come from the productive side as it would be unwise to make carly reductions in essential public services such as health, police or fire services. Thus there would come a tine in the process of reduction of this civilian part of the base when an undertaking such as the Dockyard would become inefficient and unproductive so that its contribution to the support of the Flect would have to be met by other means. The factors in deciding how this rundown would be done woro:~
(1) The relationships between Singapore dockyard and our world- vido naval dockyard capacity.
(2) Our ability to replace the Shore Support by Support afloat by the provision or retention of adequate maintenance and logistic vessels.
(3) The rate of growth of the local commercial ship repair capacity.
(4)
The orderly transfer of the dockyard facilities to some commercial concern.
(5) The rate at which the Singapore Government could accept redundancy and the spood with which they could take over the responsibilitics for such public services as health, housing, police, etc.
It was omphasised that any schone for the turnover of the dockyard to commercial work would entail a reduction in the present labour force, which has a large element for work on sophisticated equipment and weapons. Furthermore if our unhappy experience over the dockyard in Halta was not to be repeated, the early association of the Singapore Government in the management of the yard would be required, together with some diversion of effort from naval to commercial work. A final factor which would need to be borne in mind was to make the most use of the concentration of our facilities in this part of the island to enable us to maintain internal security with the minimum drain on our resources, and to be able, if we had to withdraw, totally, to have the best facilities for so doing.
C. In answer to questions after the statement, the following points were made:-
(1)
Assuming that Flcet units were not required for the Beira Patrol or the Aden withdrawal and we did not have to declaro naval forces to SATO, any part of the FEF, other than that required for the amphibious concept, could be withdrawn.
(2) The withdrawal of an Aircraft Carrior from FF and its stationing in UK to meet any commitment in the Middle East would only be a paper reduction. If the Suez Canal was closed to British warships, it would be necessary for a Carrier task force to go round the Cape of Good Hope, with the resultant delay which could be disastrous.
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TOP SECRET
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