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6.
Dr. Goh enquired whother Britain would be relinquishing the Naval Baso. Mr. Healey said that this was the assumption; Britain would not requiro any permanent facilities in the late 1970s, though her ships might wish to mako use of facilities operated by others as in many parts of the world today. still had forcos in the area thoro would no doubt be periodic visits.
If they
confirmed that facilities given up would become available to the Singaporo Governmont.
Ho also
7. Dr. Goh said that when British naval forces left there would be tho problem of keoping the sea lanes open. He envisaged an increase in Indonesian piracy which would be beyond the capacity of Singapore naval forces to control. Mr. Healoy hoped that Britain would be able to continue playing a part in proserving the freedom of the seas. He wishod to identify the effect of their current plans both on local security problems and on the local economy so as to see what steps noeded to bo taken. Ono view was that Britain should concentrate on the continued provision of the more sophisticatod naval and air weapons which might be beyond the moans of local countries.
8. Mr. Loe feared that not only Singaporo but the whole area might como to grief unless Britain's proposals wore made known unobtrusively and with great subtlety. His reactions to them were tempered by his knowlodge that the British presence could not continue at pre-Confrontation levels indefinitely; but if Britain's planning assumptions for the mid-70s were publicised now it would have a most damaging effect on the whole region. If people believed that there would bo no more than an ephemeral or illusory British presence the time-scale would be telescopod and the consequences of total withdrawal might be felt in the early 70s rather than the mid-70s. This was the lesson of Adon. All the powers in the area, whether major or minor, would base their planning assumptions on the expectation of a vacuum. He urged very strongly that we should refrain from trying, either for donostic or international reasons, to prosent a complete picture of Britain's phasing out of the region. It was not practicable to forecast events in a tidy package. Ho was concerned not so much with the policy as with its presontation. Confidence in the gencral security of the rogion would be at risk unless the change was very gradual. A sudden hiatus would be disastrous. Singapore would be hurt very painfully by the economic cuts but even that would be nogligible compared to the damage which would be caused by the public knowledge now that Britain was to withdraw completely by the mid- 70s.
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