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MR. HEALEY emphasised the general point that, although there wore obvious attractions in the concept of introducing the new policy by very gradual stages (going no further than, say 1970/71 as a first stop), it would not bo realistic to tackle the problem in this way partly because of the need for planning defence policy on a 10 year basis, and partly because of the political pressures (which were bipartisan in Britain) for a now policy in relation to the Far East.
5. MR. LE KUAN YEM mode clear that his primary anxiety related to the prospect that, after about 1975, there would no longer bo cny British military presence in the cres. This would have a damaging effect on confidence in Singapore, with serious immediate consequences in the economic as well as in the political field. He emphasised his fear of what the impact would be on neighbouring countries in the Far East of the announcement of a final deadline for a British withdrawal. It was likely that a power vacuum would be created which would generate a serious feeling of insecurity as well as causing an economic setback. If it were possible for IMG to decide to koop some form of presence or military capability beyond the mid 1970s, this would be very helpful. If HMG wore not prepared to do this, and announce it, there could be a sharp collapse of confidence among those on whom Singapore depended for investment and commercial interests. MR. LT KUAN YI explained that his preference would be for a continuing military presence of some kind on the mainland; he felt that "an immobile element" offered a more credible guarantee. Mo did not dissent, however, from the view, put to him by Mr. Healey, that the occasional rotation of forces in and out of the arce and their deployment on exercises in the Far East, could also demonstrate effectively a British military capability.
In
6. us to the immediate future, MR. LEE KUAN YIW indicated that he was handling a number of current issues the only example which he mentioned was the introduction of the new currency which made him anxious to keep the local situation as stable as possible for the next 18 months. answer to a question from Mr. Healey, he mentioned that the elections would have to take place before December 1963; but he did not appear particularly anxious about the impact on them of the now developments. He agreed that the fact-finding team should come to Singapore on the date planned; and that, at the fullor meeting fixed for 24th April, the handling of withdrawals over the next 12 months or so should be a major issue for discussion. He and Mr. Healey agreed to meet again, before the fuller. meeting took place, in order to discuss how it should be handled.
Other Matters
7. Other matters which wore briefly discussed were these:
Q.. Indonesia
MR. LEE KUN YE! expressed the view that the Indonesians wore obsessed with their domestic political and economic problems; they wore finding it hard to get things going in the country, and there tended to be friction between the Army and civilian authorities.
b.
Vietnam
MR. HELAY said that he had recently visited Washington, and that he had certainly scen no sign of the U.5. Government weckoning in their resolve in relation to the Vietnam wer;
the expense they were incurring was enormous,
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