(97793)
8.
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(c) Duration of Operations, and Warning Time. War roserves in
the theatre would only be adequate to sustain major operations
for sixty days. Establishment of supply lines from the United Kingdom would take up to three months. Accordingly,
either we need a 30-day warning period, as is assumed for
the defence of Malaysia; or we should have to delay committing . our forces, as would be the case for SEATO Plan 4. The delay in providing armoured and medium artillery support, as would be expected of us by Australia and New Zealand in SEATO Plan 4
would be three months. At present the Commonwealth Brigade is required to complete the deployment of its teeth arm
units within 11 days.
(a) Concurrent Operations. It would not be possible to carry out
operations under SEATO Plan 4 and at the same time to assist
in the defence of Malaysia. Nor, if we were involved in either, could we carry out internal security operations other than in Hong Kong unless the timing permitted logistic reinforcement. (e) The Unforeseen. The force structures considered result from
a number of assumptions, which are essentially restrictive in
nature. There would be little flexibility if events developed
unexpectedly.
On present plans, however, there will still be 33 Gurkha units in Malaysia/Singapore in 1970. They form no part of the force structures
derived in Study No. 7 and may to this extent be regarded as surplus,
except that one Gurkha battalion might be used to guard the point
of entry. But so long as they remain, they form a reserve that could be
invaluable in some circumstances, though there are limitations on their use.
Costs.
9. Only an approximate indication can be given at this stage of the manpower and foreign exchange costs of the forces in Cases A and B. The main uncertainty arises in connection with the requirements for logistic facilities to support the combat forces; only a broad assessment has been possible so far, and firm figures could only be derived from prolonged and detailed studies in the Far East. With this qualification, the position at 1st April 1972 can be summarised as follows
Manpower
Annual Foreign Exchange
Cost
Defence Revier
72,500
£66.5 million
Case A
34,500
Case B
37,000
£ 40 million
€ 45 million
10. The budgetary saving would depend on the extent to which forces
withdrawn from the theatre can be disbanded and on the consequential
changes in the United Kingdom base, and these in turn will become clear
only when other studies have been completed.
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