TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 169

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FAR EAST

(7) To work out new force levels for the Far East aimed at reducing Defence Review force levels by about a half on the following assumptions:-

(a) we should assume that Indonesia is unlikely to indulge in military

adventures of a kind which could involve us under the

(b)

Anglo-Malaysia Defence Agreement. If she were to do so, we could expect considerable notice. For the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, we should only deploy forces adequate to maintain a secure entry into both countries and to ensure the local security of our forces and facilities, together with Naval forces for maritime patrol activities;

we should retain some aircraft with a nuclear capability in the

Far East, as a contribution to the process of deterring China from

direct military aggression;

(c) we should make a contribution to a Commonwealth Strategic Force.

This contribution, which will not have the same composition as our present forces in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, will constitute our total declaration to SEATO;

(a) forces will be withdrawn from Brunei by 1970;

(e) no forces will be provided specifically and solely for:

(i) major operations without our allies

(ii) external defence of Eastern Malaysia or Brunei

(iii) internal security other than defence of British installations

(iv) SEATO

(f) full account will be taken in assessing force levels of existing

and planned forces of Malaysia and Singapore;

(g) specific provision will be made for reinforcement from the United

Kingdom by a brigade with Naval and Air Support, for the defence of

Malaysia and Singapore;

(h) a minimum warning period of 30 days (subject to review by the Joint

Intelligence Committee) will be assumed for the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore;

(i) reductions in force levels will be phased gradually between

October 1967 and 1st April 1970;

(j) supporting formations and facilities will be restricted to the

minimum necessary for the reduced force levels.

The budgetary and overseas cost implications of alternative force structures

should be shown.

(2)

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