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And in
would involve us in undertakings which would preclude an agreed further withdrawal, on worthwhile terms, for a much longer period. Given the constraints in other theatres, this means postponing the prospects of really substantial savings in defence expenditure until the mid or late 1970s, i.e. for nearly a decade. Meanwhile, the economic and political pressures to make sizeable cuts in defence expenditure, both in budgetary and foreign exchange terms, will continue to mount. this context even five years is a very long time. Against this background, they suggest that Ministers should consider giving a direction that the objective of Her Majesty's Government's policy is to withdraw completely from Singapore and Malaysia (with a minimum redeployment in Australia) by a defined date early in the 1970s; further work on the political, military and financial (including economic aid) implications of this should be commissioned urgently; and that in the forthcoming consultations with our allies we should make our objective clear. In so doing Ministers might think it important to inform the local governments concerned that while we accepted the need to offer some mitigating economic aid, the level at which this could be made available would necessarily be related to the co-operation they gave us in carrying out our chosen programme.
42.
that
The Ministry of Defence view is that if it is decided that further substantial reductions are to be made in the Defence Budget during the next few years and that these involve a change of policy in the Far East, then it is necessary, at least for internal purposes, to take a decision
In these in principle now and to set target dates for planning purposes. circumstances an assumption about the date of our leaving Singapore would have to be made. The Ministry of Defence suggest that for planning
The forces in the Far East purposes the date 1975-76 should be used. would be run down in an orderly fashion at the best speed the local situation will allow. As far as local labour in Singapore is concerned, it should be the aim to reach the half-way mark by 1970-71. Our commit- ments and obligations should be restricted and qualified in step with the reductions in our forces. It would also be necessary to make an assumption
about-the-level of forces we should maintain in Australia using Australian facilities. The Ministry of Defence believes that assumptions of this kind
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