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31. Many of the political considerations which apply to total withdrawal from the theatre apply also, at least at present, to withdrawal in the near future from Singapore and Malaysia and a limited military presence instead in Australia. For Australia and New Zealand a presence in Australia could not compensate over the next few years for our withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia. They consider that our continuing presence in Singapore and Malaysia so long as we are welcome is a unique contribu- tion which we can make to the stability of the area and thus to their
until security. The position of the United States is rather different: there is a settlement in Vietnam, their feelings will be as strong as those of Australia and New Zealand. After that, their position may be radically different. Nevertheless a minimum presence in Australia, though it would be evident that its scale was probably too small for it to serve much serious military purpose without substantial reinforcement, would politically be very much more acceptable to the Americans, than no presence at all in the Far East. The Australians and the New Zealanders could also be expected to prefer a minimum presence to none at all.
even
The immediate difficulties as regards relations between Singapore and Malaysia and as regards additional unemployment in Singapore would of course be the same as for total withdrawal.
Practical Limitations
32. It is necessary also to bear in mind the practical limitations on the rate at which our reductions in forces in the Far East can be achieved, even on the assumption that consultations proceed smoothly and no obstacles are met with on the way. There are very great practical difficulties in a complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia in the period up to 1970-71. One is the problem of the Gurkhas: we are running down the Gurkhas from their present strength of about 14,500 to a strength of 10,000, but this rundown will not be completed until 1969. Complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia would involve a further reduction in the strength of the Brigade of Gurkhas, to about 5,000, and we could
This would leave not expect to achieve this before 1972 at the earliest. three Gurkha battalions in Hong Kong, the highest number politically acceptable there. Secondly, the reorganisation of British forces which would be necessary could not be done rapidly: the problems involved in reshaping the forces, deciding on the consequential disbandments and carrying them out, not to speak of the practical problems involved in returning troops and their families to the United Kingdom and accommodating them until they could be disbanded, and returning or disposing of stores and equipment, are such that these alone would take at least five years on mi military grounds alone.
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