TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 155

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that our main specific commitments in the theatre are to Malaysia, Singapore and SEATO and that we have responsibilities towards our remaining dependent territories in the area; but our broad interests are

much more closely related to the United States, Australia and New Zealand.

The cost of maintaining our forces at Defence Review levels in Singapore and Malaysia is out of proportion to our economic stake in South East Asia,

both absolutely and relatively to our forces in other areas, Moreover, the

United States have made abundantly clear the great importance which they attach to our continuing to play a role there. If we are prepared to accept major changes in our policy with all their consequences in the Far East,

there are two main possibilities to consider

(a) the maintenance of a minimum presence, probably with maritime

and air forces in the main, using facilities in Australia.

This is the possibility that was envisaged at the time of the

Defence Review at such time as we might not be able to stay in Malaysia and Singapore on acceptable terms;

(b) total withdrawal from the theatre, phased over whatever period

Ministers consider to be feasible.

Total Withdrawal

27.

The military consequences of total withdrawal would be far-reaching and require much further study. The whole size and shape of the armed

services would be affected, and a detailed appreciation would take a

considerable time. No figure can be given for the budgetary affect in

1970-71 of total withdrawal for two main reasons

(a) a great deal would turn on the precise timing;

(b) account would have to be taken of decisions on the size and

shape of forces in other theatres and on the way in which

equipment programmes were recast or cancelled, which would

have a profound effect on the Defence Budget in 1970-71, and

the nature of these decisions cannot readily be forecast.

It seems highly prohable, however, that within a few years of 1970-71,

assuming no radical increase in forces or commitments in other areas, the

Defence Budget could be reduced well below the target level of the present

studies. In any event, however, there are very severe practical limitations to withdrawal in this time-scale which are mentioned in paragraphs 32-34

below. We now turn to the broader political considerations involved.

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