TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 143

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(b)

The dovetailing of the local rundown with reductions in force levels: it might be disadvantageous, through a precipitate reduction in Singapore,

to provoke disproportionate demands for economic cid while at the same time

being obliged to take costly measures to accommodate forces which are

returning home at a faster rate than they are being, disbanded.

(c)

Major equipment programmes which can have a lead time of up to ten

years and a life thereafter of up to twenty years.

(a) The disposal of stockpiles and facilities. In the case of Singapore this would take five to eight years,

9. The Ministry of Defence view is that the only realistic way of

planning a withdrawal is to fix a date now for domestic planning purposes.

Unless such a planning date is fixed it will not be possible to achieve the

maximum savings by 1970-71 or in subsequent years, to work out the size and shape of the Services after 1970-71, to take decisions about equipment, or to

reduce the Services in a sensible and orderly fashion. They also consider

that the earliest practicable date, bearing i. nind repercussions in

Singapore, is likely to be 1975-76. The Treasury and Department of Economic

Affairs agree that a date should be fixed but consider that further study

should be nade to see if an earlier date is practicable.

10.

The further question arises whether, if a date is fixed for planning purposes, it could be kept secret. Recent experience suggests that there would be likely to be a leak soon and in any event the implications from

published changes in our equipment programme or the future size of the Army

are likely to indicate the date clearly before long. In addition the Treasury and Department of Economic Affairs believe that unless a date is published, events may lead us to stay longer than we otherwise need and that, quite

apart from the tining of eventual withdrawal, we shall not achieve the savings

we otherwise could from now on through planning the most economical rate of reduction of our forces. The publication of the date would also facilitate related planning of the economy as a whole. The Minis try of Defence do not

dissent from these views.

11.

On the other hand, the political Departments, while accepting the advantage to planning of fixing a date, see great disadvantage in announcing any date for withdrawal now and fear that even the existence of a date for planning purposes is likely to become known, with even more danaging effect. They point out that we would expect to be able to negotiate a major reduction of our forces to achieve a rate of saving by 1970-71 not substantially less than that which would be achieved by planning now for total withdrawal.

By

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