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24. The presence of our forces deters military confrontation between Singapore and Malaysia. Once they are gone Singapore might be tempted to protect herself both by building up her armaments and by intriguing with the Malaysian Chinese. Her embarking on either course could provide a pretext for Malaysia to pre-empt the situation by attempting to take Singapore over. This affects the question of military aid to both
countries which is discussed in paragraphs 55-56 below.
SEATO Powers
(a) France
25. Since France is not to be represented at the SEATO meeting, and since she is only a sleeping partner in the alliance, it will be unnecessary to nake any special provision for her. On the other hand there night be some advantage in HM Ambassador in Paris explaining our intentions in general terms at some suitable time, since our actions could be appropriately presented as an indication of our desire to concentrate upon Europe. This would require further study, since there could be a danger that the French might wish to "leak" the decision.
(b) Thailand and Philippines
26.
Our intention to withdraw would be thoroughly unwelcome to both Thailand and the Philippines. They would equate the United Kingdom as a SEATO power with France and Pakistan, and they would further consolidate round the United States as the only power capable of ensuring their
security and independence. SEATO night thus well become an adjunct to the Vietnam war. The Thais would be likely to ask us about our ability to commit our forces under SEATO Plan 4, and although we could probably say, in the initial stages, that this was one of the matters which would have to be studied, in the long run we should have to explain our inability to fulfil the commitment. Both Thailand and the Philippines would tend
to write us off as an influence in the Far East, and we could not escape
sone short-term damage to our commercial interests, in an expanding
market, especially in the field of governmental contracts, We could to some extent offset these sentiments if we were able to give both these
countries more economic aid. If our own financial position makes this difficult we should at least show, in our public statements and especially
in our attitude at SEATO meetings, a sympathetic understanding of the
aspirations of the countries of East Asia toward regional co-operation and
economic development; and we should make it clear that, to the extent that
our means allow, we shall actively support them in these objectives.
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