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14. Thus as has been stressed before, timing and some degree of
flexibility are of the greatest advantage in our approach. It will be necessary to guard against the risk of delaying the achievement of the savings; but a flexible approach to the manner and phasing of the reductions, within the fixed points of 50 per cent reduction by 1970-71 and complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975-76 is more likely in practice to enable us to make early savings than a rigid approach which could well lead to a clash and to a slower rate of reduction at all stages. Although in due course we shall have to give the Americans an indication of force reductions, it will be important to stress that on our current thinking we shall not go below
about half Defence Review levels before 1970-71 unless things go
better, both for the Americans and for us, then we foresee at present.
At the same time we shall want to explain to the Americans that we
shall do our best to cushion both Malaysia and Singapore over the worst
of the economic effects of the rundown and possibly invite their
co-operation in dealing with this. Even if the Americans are reluctant
to grant aid on the scale we should like, they might be prepared at
least to offer technical and other assistance. Against this, however, we may well have to face American pressure to increase our aid elsewhere
in the region. At present we can resist such pressure by pointing to
the heavy burden of our military expenditure in the area.
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