TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 106

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in the area and the probability of their wishing to create their own arrange-

ments for mutual defence; and to argue that while it was true that we were at present still welcome in the Far East, in a few years' time, particularly after the end of the Vietnam war (when the United States themselves no

longer wished to stay on the mainland of Asia), this sentiment would almost

certainly have changed; and that it would be only sensible politically, as

well as in accord with our economic interests, to decide now on a long-term

withdrawal over the horizon. To carry out this decision in such a way as

to mitigate the likelihood of instability required long-term planning in close

consultation with the other countries concerned.

5. In discussion with the United States, we might concentrate particularly

on their own plans after the end of the Vietnam war. In our consultations

with Australia and New Zealand the emphasis should be on our desire to

examine with them how best to proceed so that we could achieve our objective

with least damage to their defence and to establish whether they see

advantages in co-operating with us to maintain a maritime and air presence

using Australian facilities beyond the middle 1970s. It will however be a

major difficulty in our discussions if we cannot commit ourselves to doing so

if they wish indeed it will hardly be possible to mention the prospect seriously at this stage and subsequently to refuse in the middle of this year

to base such forces in Australia. With Singapore/Malaysia we should

emphasise our concern to do all that we could to ensure economic stability

by providing aid on a generous scale to offset the effects of our military

rundown, drawing attention also to the possibility of assistance from

development agencies and to the use which they might make in developing their

economy of the various facilities that we would be giving up. It would be

important from the outset for us to do all that we can to ensure that any

offer of aid that we make, even in a generalised form, is as tightly linked

as possible to a programme agreed with us covering military as well as

economic plans, including our own rate of rundown. While conscious of the

bargaining position of other governments we must equally be mindful of our

own, including in particular the provision of a crucially important level of

aid.

6. A main point for decision is when we should inform our allies of the

date by which we plan to withdraw all our forces from Malaysia and Singapore (in more precise terms than the formula we propose in paragraph 3). Until

we have committed ourselves domestically to a date we are inhibited in planning the detailed rundown of our forces and thus in carrying out an economical military programme, and in discussing, particularly with Singapore, the means

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