TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 101

TOP SECRET

(c)

The effect on the Defence budget of a possible military presence in Australia could not be assessed until further studies had been made of

the nature of this presence. The principal factor affecting costs would be whether a significant reinforcement capability were provided in the United Kingdom in addition to forces earmarked for other purposes.

The

Australians might well be more concerned about our reinforcement capability than about the size and composition of forces actually stationed in Australia.

(a) In the light of a Ministerial decision on whether or not to keep open until June or July the option of a military presence in Australia, it

was for consideration whether an offer should be made to the Australians

or a request from them awaited. The Australians were likely to enquire about our intentions at an early stage in the discussions, and any positive reply on our part would commit us. We had already gone sone way in the past eighteen months towards committing ourselves to a presence in Australia if and when we withdraw from Singapore, since we had offered to explore

with them the facilities we should need. The Australians had however not

yet decided whether to provide the facilities in Western Australia for

their own purposes.

While at the time of the Defence Review they had not

received the idea with particular enthusiasm, since we had said only that

we might withdraw from Singapore, their attitude might be very different when we told them that we were definitely leaving Singapore and Malaysia.

Practical Difficulties in achieving Reductions

(e) While the report laid stress on the difficulties of discharging

civilian labour in Singapore, there was no reference to the problems

involved in reducing the overall size of the British Services. These

reductions would be difficult to achieve in the short time available if

proper provision were made for an orderly rundown and for retraining.

(f) The little time available for studying the implications of the new

policy involved a risk that the full consequences could not be evaluated

before Ministerial decisions were taken. This particularly affected the

consequences for the services in the United Kingdom, which should however

be clearer by the time final decisions were taken in the middle of the year.

(g) The reason for the prospective savings in local costs in the Far East in 1970-71 representing a smaller proportion of present costs than the

corresponding reductions in nanpower strengths was two-fold: first, the

manpower savings were concentrated on the less costly categories; and

secondly, the greater part of the savings on the stockpiles in Singapore

would not be achieved by then.

-2-

TOP SECRET