TNAG-0052-FCO40-88-Communist-activities-in-schools-1968 — Page 93

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context chosen, the assessment seems to me wrong. Surely it is contra- dicted by the Border Agreement of November 1967, which involved concessions but brought distinct benefits for Hong Kong and was generally welcomed by public opinion there? It neglects the attitude of the Peking Govern- ment which, since December last year, had sought to restrain and conal the Hong Kong Communists. If we show that the only result of Peking ending viclence and controlling extremist forces in Hong Kong is that we increase our pressure on the Communist: in the Colony, then we give a clinching argument to the extremists, whether in Canton, Peking or Commonwealth. We should remember that there are probably also people on the Chinese side arguing that no concessions are of any use.

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or should be, our object to ensure that they do not take complete control. The policy now advocated by Hong Kong seems certain to worsen our general relations with China and may even risk provoking renewed violence in Hong Kong itself,

7, In telegram No. 831 paragraph 6 it is stated that while there is no objection to reasonably well conducted Communists schools, in fact there are none. The implications seem to be that we are to engage in a fight against Communist education as such and will take the necessary measures, beginning with the deregistration of Chung Wah. I must repeat 19 my warning in telegram No. 577 paragraph 5 that this is a new policy

which conflicts with our assurances of co-existence to Chinese and which will bring us into direct collision with Peking. It is clear that one thing Peking will insist on is the "sacred right to study Mao's Thoughts". It is also clear from latest Hong Kong Elucation Department's report (for quarter ending 31 March) that situation in Communist schools is quietening down. It is surely in our interests to encourage this.

80 As regards likely reactions in Peking to deregistration, paragraph 9 of telegram No. 831 suggests some misunderstanding of the situation. My prediction of likely immediate effect is in paragraph 2 of telegram No. 577. I do not expect violence against this office as a result. I feel sure on the other hand that if we act in this way we shall prolong indefinitely our present impasse as regards this Mission and other British subjects in China and in the longer term prejudice any hope of restoring modus vivendi with China on which the continuing existence of Hong hong must depend. It is the wider implications of the Governor's proposal for Sino-British relations that I am principally concerned with. No reference to these occurs in the telegrams under reference.

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I am afraid that these two telegrams from Hong Kong confirm the fears expressed in my telegram No. 577. Hitherto I had thought that there was underlying agreement that we wished to end confrontation and restore normal relations and that our arguments were only about best means. It is now clear that we are not all agreed about the ends and that Hong Kong in fact are seeking an altogether different and tougher policy with serious implications. I should be grateful for clarification and I hope reassurance on Her Majesty's Government's policy. It is essential we should know where we stand.

10 On particular question of Chung Wan school, I maintain the recommen- dation in my telegram No. 577 i.e. that we should not repeat not deregister now, since this will be seen by Chinese as provocative and inconsistent with our professed intentions. 1 do not regard this as a concession to them but as common prudence in nc going out of our way to stir up additional trouble.

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