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our objection is to violence. We state there is freedom of speech and education in the Colony and have informed the Chinese, on 13 April in our reply to Lo Kuei-po, that we do not object to study of Mao, or anyone else, provided it remains within the frame-work of the law. If we are now to attempt suppression of Communist schools as such, we make nonsense of these assurances and embark on a new and dangerous policy which we probably lack the power to enforce and in which we can expect all-out opposition from Peking.
6.
The third argument is that the reopening of a major Communist school will be a bad blow to public morale. As I have said in correspondence on Naval visits, I find it hard to believe that the Hong Kong public as a whole would wish to have a further battle with local Communists or China or that they would react badly to measures which suggest a return to normality. The return to normal life in Hong Kong, which is our object, must involve reopening of schools, the release of prisoners and restarting of Communist newspapers. All these, according to one interpretation, might be represented as defeats for us and victories for the Communists. But I must repeat that I see the presentation or issues in this form as over-simplified and in-applicable to Hong Kong situation, where the future depends not on attempts to surpress Communists but on the achievement of some kind of peaceful coexistence. Provided always order is obtained resumption of normal life is only to our benefit, both in Hong Kong and in the wider context of Sino-British relations.
7. I have set out these comments at some length since I rind the proposals in telegram under reference and assumptions behind it extremely disturbing. I do not discount the extreme difficulties of the Hong Kong problem. But as seen from here it is essential to avoid getting into a position where any conciliatory gesture or adjustment to take account of Peking sensitivities is to be rejected automatically as a surrender to Communists. If we are to adopt this viewpoint, and it strongly [gp undec? upsets] telegram under reference, then we are in effect changing policy hitherto pursued over Hong Kong and makes the prospect for improvement in Sino-British relations and in the treatment of British subjects in China virtually non-existant.
Foreign Office pass Hong Kong 421 Priority.
Sir D. Hopson.
[Repeated as requested]
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