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a proposal which could not succeed, and could well attract
hostile reactions from the Six. So far as Hong Kong was
concerned, Association was clearly a non-starter.
Morocco-type Protocol
15. Mr. Haddon-Cave explained that, in his understanding, such an arrangement would apply only to a limited range of commodities, which would not be in direct competition with products from the Community; a Morocco-type protocol would in fact only be advantageous to Hong Kong if its scope were not so limited. Mr. Audland pointed out that the Morocco Protocol was not now viewed with favour by the Six themselves and was regarded essentially as a transitional provision.
Mr. Haddon-Cave said that as Hong Kong did not wish to run the risk of provoking inconvenient counter-proposals from the Six, and as the benefits of a Morocoo-type protocol seemed small, there would be little point in pressing for such an arrangement.
The gradual application of the c.e.t. to Hong Kong 16. Mr. Haddon-Cave said that the position differed now from 1962 as Britain would have to put up tariffs not only against Commonwealth countries but also against those of her EFTA partners which did not become Members of the E.E.C
no doubt there would
be some general provisions for the gradual application of the c.e.t. He felt there was a lot to be said for Hong Kong being content with such general provisions: the Territory would not then be given special treatment of a kind which could encourage the Six to seek safeguards against Hong Kong competition. Sir. Snelling confirmed that Britain would be seeking the agreement of the Six to transitional arrangements for the adoption of the c.e.t. It could certainly be argued that Hong Kong would do best to accept the standard transitional arrangements rather than seek special ones and so risk provoking the Six to counter-proposals.
/A Declaration by
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