TNAG-0046-FCO40-82-Britain-s-entry-into-EEC-effect-on-trade-with-Hong-Kong-1967 — Page 131

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) They have a realistic approach, and are in

particular well aware of the difficulties

we are likely to encounter with the Six.

(b) They recognise that rights of access are

of greater importance to Hong Kong than

tariff levels, and set great store by the

preservation and continued exercise of

their G.A.T.T. rights.

(c) They are keenly aware of the danger that

any request to the Six for special arrange-

ments for Hong Kong is likely to stimulate

the latter to seek protection from Hong

Kong competition, e.g. by a demand for a

market disruption clause or severe origin

criteria. For this reason they displayed

a clear preference for course (i) above,

perhaps coupled with course (v); but they

stressed that their views on this were

preliminary.

(a) They recognise that Association and a

Morocco-type Protocol are both unnegotiable.

(e) They themselves droy attention at the consul-

tations to the declining importance for Hong

Kong of the British market (whose share of

Hong Kong exports fell from just over 20% in

1960 to about 17% in 1966); and to the

growing importance for her of the markets of

the Six (whose share grew from 5% to 10%

over the same period).

(f) They see no problems for Hong Kong as regards

sterling or immigration.

CONFIDENTIAL

/THE