TNAG-0045-FCO40-81-Britain-s-entry-into-EEC-effect-on-trade-with-Hong-Kong-1967 — Page 157

CONFIDENTIAL

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It was, however, primarily a public relations exercise and

there was no serious discussion of the form which a special

solution for New Zealand might take.

9. As a result of the publicity which Mr. Marshall's tour

attracted in New Zealand and his over optimistic statements

about the attitude of the Six, the Prime Minister's statement

of 10 November was received there with some confidence that

everything possible would be done to take New Zealand's

interests into account.

Nevertheless, after he had received

advance notice of the statement, Mr. Holyoake sent a message to

the Prime Minister in which he said:

given the structure of New Zealand's economy

and trade, we must have a permanent solution, that

is,

one which endures beyond any transitional

provisions for Britain's entry

•

Mr. Wilson replied that he and the Foreign Secretary would bear

this carefully in mind during the probing exercise.

During

his discussions in Rome the Prime Minister said that New

Zealand presented perhaps the gravest obstacle, which could

not be surmounted by transitional arrangements alone.

Signor Fanfani agreed that New Zealand was a special case;

he hoped it could be dealt with without too much trouble.

10. We should be seeking, for New Zealand, a solution which

would maintain the level of her exports to Britain or to the

enlarged Community (or her export earnings). There are several

ways in which this could theoretically be done and, while the

Secretary of State will not wish to express any view at this

stage, an indication of New Zealand ideas would be useful.

CONFIDENTIAL