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the talks went well so far as personal relations were concerned.
President de Gaulle did not raise on this occasion the objections
to our entry which had led him to impose a veto in 1963. The
main difficulty which he saw was that British membership would
profoundly change the character of a closely-knit Community.
An important consideration for the French is, of course their
present pre-eminence in the Community. He mentioned as
alternatives British association or "something new and different".
The meaning of the latter was not clear. The Prime Minister
replied that only membership of the Community would provide a
sufficient basis for the wider political unity which we felt
must be the aim. Apart from this, the discussion related
almost wholly to the implications of the sterling balances
for the functioning of the Community if we became a member.
President de Gaulle recognised a clear difference between the
attitude of the present British Government and that which we
had demonstrated during the 1961-3 negotiations. He made
relatively little of our links with the United States and took
our point that we should seek to strengthen Europe so that it
might play its proper part in relation both to the United States
and to the Soviet Union.
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After the visits to the Community have been completed,
the Government will want to take careful stock of the position.
If the omens appear favourable for a successful negotiation,
we should then need to work out a negotiating position. At that
Shall be conandting you agam stage we (should need to consult you about your essential
interests and how those interests could best be safeguarded.
It is, I think, still too early to decide upon the method of
consultation though I should, of course, be pleased to have
your views on this. It seems to me that it will probably be
desirable to consult different Commonwealth Governments in
different ways.
/Notes for Supplementaries
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