TNAG-0043-FCO40-79-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1968 — Page 93

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future. At present, the policy of the Chinese is to maintain and expand their commercial interests in the Colony. Politically, the Chinese will no doubt profit from their experience of the last year in rebuilding the local communist apparatus and seek through this and through increased propaganda activities to broaden their base of support in Hong Kong. A heightening of the level of propaganda would probably precede action to take over the Colony. The nature and intensity of propaganda about Hong Kong, both within the Colony and outside, should therefore serve as an indicator of Chinese intentions.

Contingencies

40.

There are, however, circumstances in which the Chinese might seek to reduce the Hong Kong Government to a position of clear subservience, or even take over the Colony, before the expiry of the lease in 1997. Such circumstances could well be created by: (a) Events in Hong Kong which directly and seriously damaged

Chinese prestige or obliged the Chinese to take active steps to fulfil their self-assumed role of "protector" of all those

of Chinese race;

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(b)

(c)

(a)

(e)

a severe deterioration of law and order in Hong Kong coupled with economic chaos which might cause the Chinese to assume their role as "protector" as in (a) above;

an attempt to change the present status of Hong Kong in the direction of independence or closer association with Taiwan (or any third country), or to give it any other status which would impede its eventual reversion to China; a struggle for power in Peking (or even in Kwangtung Province) in which either the opposition or the ruling faction wished to focus attention on some external issue with high emotional and nationalistic overtones;

or the emergence of a semi-autonomous Province of Kwangtung which might see economic or political advantage in taking over the

Colony;

A Sino-American war in which the United Kingdom supported the United States or granted facilities in Hong Kong for operations against China.

41. In the situations envisaged in (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 40 above, China's initial aims would probably be limited, as during 1967, to making the Hong Kong Government acknowledge a dependent /status

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