TNAG-0043-FCO40-79-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1968 — Page 72

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THE HONG KONG GARRISON

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The Working Party considered a memorandum by the Ministry of Defence (OPDO(DR)(68) 7) on the strength of the Hong Kong garrison after 1971.

MR. CAMPBELL said that the Ministry of Defence memorandum was based on the study agreed by the Chiefs of Staff in March with two main changes: no assessment of the threat to the Colony was included, and a section had been added on the division of the costs of the garrison. Ministers had

decided in December 1966 that the strength of the garrison should be reduced to five and two-thirds major units; but the decision had not been

implemented owing to the internal disturbances in the Colony. The garrison was reinforced in June 1967 and now stood at a total of seven and two-thirds units. The Ministry of Defence considered that after 1971 we

should maintain seven and two-thirds units in Hong Kong, together with two frigates (as against one at present), five mine counter-measures vessels (MCMVs), and six Whirlwind helicopters, as well as the appropriate

support facilities. They had also considered whether fighters should be

permanently stationed in Hong Kong. There was no military justification

for this, but the Governor considered that the presence of fighter aircraft

was desirable, particularly on the grounds of maintaining the morale of

the local population. A self-contained unit of four Hunters and a Hunter trainer could be provided when the squadron in Singapore was withdrawn in

March 1970 and could be sustained until 1975, when the position would have

to be reviewed.

The case for the proposed increase in the strength of the garrison

rested on our departure from Singapore and Malaysia in 1971. A reduction

of one major unit from the present seven and two-thirds was acceptable

only so long as the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, retained the ability to

reinforce the garrison, which he could do at present within seventy-two hours (or less if notice were given). When a reinforcement capability

could no longer be provided from Singapore, reinforcement from the United

Kingdom would be necessary. This would take sixty hours using the

Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) route or seventy-two hours using the Westabout route; but these timings assumed that there would be no difficulty about overflying rights and also that no major operations were taking place elsewhere at the time. The Ministry of Defence therefore considered that the immediate reserve battalion should be permanently stationed in the Colony once we reached the situation in which we could not provide it from Singapore or Malaysia. The increase in the naval garrison and the proposed retention of the Whirlwinds also resulted from the inability to provide such forces from Singapore after 1971, or in some

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