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(t) In certain circumstances we might consider making an
informal and disavowable approach to the Chinese
aimed at reaching a tacit understanding with them
about an eventual withdrawal at a suitable agreed
date.
(u) The Chinese response to a formal or informal approach
would depend very much on whether it suited their
policy and interests at the time to take the Colony
over and, of course, on the strength of our position.
The chances of a favourable response would be best if
the Chinese were genuinely anxious, for economic
reasons, to take Hong Kong over with minimum damage
to the economy; our negotiating position would be
strongest if we sought to withdraw when the Hong Kong
economy was its normal buoyant self and there was no
Chinese pressure.
(v) Our position is, however, weak in that we have many
hostages in the Colony in terms of people and assets
and no means of bringing significant pressure to bear
on China. Its strength will rest on Hong Kong's
economic value to China and on our ability to hand
it over with that value unimpaired and its trading
links with Western countries kept open. To use this
card changed attitudes towards China on the part of
some Western countries will be a prerequisite.
(w) The initiative does not effectively lie in our hands:
the Chinese could always frustrate our attempts to
negotiate or reach an understanding with them. But
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/on
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