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felt obliged to withdraw (paragraphs 56-57 above). But
as a course of action likely to be actively opposed by China it should not be adopted unless Chinese intransigence
or internal conditions compel us to do so. We can be sure
that the Chinese will not stand by and permit us to withdraw
without some interference. However, in circumstances where
the climate for a negotiated handover appears favourable
but the Chinese do not respond to our overtures, it is
conceivable that a declaration of intention to withdraw
coupled with an expressed readiness to talk about it might
bring the Chinese to the conference table. Much would depend on whether our departure suited China's interest at that time. 70. In our view the acceptance of a Macao-type situation (the second course) will not at any time provide an acceptable means
On the face of it, it could have the merit of frustrating the worst Chinese intentions; and, by a process of gradual assimilation to Chinese control, it might help to avoid the disruptive, possibly violent, consequences of a sudden transfer of authority. But, as has been noted in
paragraph 14 of our Interim Report, it would put us entirely in the hands of the Chinese, both as to the manner and timing of our final departure; our bargaining position would be compromised when it came to seeking an eventual settlement; our people there would be hostages who would be used to
extract the maximum concessions. We would be faced by serious economic and political repercussions in Hong Kong in a situation of dwindling confidence. Additionally our lack of effective authority could raise acute political difficulties in relation to Ministers' responsibilities
of withdrawal.
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