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Recommendations
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We should recognise that Hong Kong's future aust
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eventually 11s in China and that our objective must be to attempt to negotiate its return, at a favourable opportunity. on the best terms obtainable for its people and for our
material interests there.
Withdrawal should not be contemplated while present conditions in China persist. We could not negotiate terms
that would take care of our responsibilities towards the
people or our material intereste.
We should look for a suitable opportunity to offer to negotiate our withdrawal with China, as soon as a nore
moderate resine energes there. It is important to make this
offer when not under Chinese pressure and before the economy
of the Colony starte to run down in the 1980s.
Teanwhile we should show firmly that we intend to
maintain our position thero, giving no indication that we
contemplate withdrawal. If Hong Kong is suddenly wrested-
from us or se sve obliged to take a hurried unilateral
-decision to withdraw, we should not expect to salvage any er our intereste er fulfil any of our obligations,
At regular intervals (say every three years) and at
any time conditions in Chine change significantly for the better future policy towards the Colony should be revioved, in consultation with the Governor, for the purpose of assessing the prospects of concluding satisfactory
negotiations for the Colony's return. In so doing we
should bear in mind the need to obtain support from our friends and allies (particularly the Americane) for what
we will be proposing to do, since the saintenance of Hong Kong's trading links with them may prove to be our strongest bargaining counter in any negotiations with the
Chinese.
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