could hold out prospects that it would continue to
sarn foreign exchange in Chinese haşás, Our ability to
play this card postulates a very different attitude to
trade with China on the part of the U.5.A. (which takes 36% of all Hong Kong's exports) and some understanding
with our other Western allies and friends who trade with
China and Hong Kong that they would not regard the abunge
of administration as an opportunity to reduce drastically
or cut off altogether their trade with the latter. I
ve cannot make use of this card than wo shall be reduced
to such economic counters as continuing to give noceas
to Hong Kong products in our om Barkete and the diaposal
of Hong Kong assets held in London.
23. Overt American involvement in negotiations for
handing-over Hong Kong seems out of the question giv
prezent V.3. polloien,
in situation the best
could expect would be that fear of American reaction to a
forcible take-over might be a factor inclining China to
seek a negotiated solution and, in doing so, not to proue
us too hard. On the other hand, if American attitudes
were to change to the extent of lending their weight to
a negotiated transfer, it seems likely that there might
be a climate in 0.8./Chinese relations in which the
Chinese might well judge that they had no reason to fear
strong American action orgressure ca our behalf.
sa
24. It is unlikely that we could make any play with hizm
fact that in international law tiong Kong Island and the
tip of Kowloon peninsula were ceded to us in perpetuâ ty
(see paragraph 1 of Section A), in the face of China's
attitude that these were "unequal treaties"
attitude for which there could be considerable suppert
from other countries, particularly those disputing ceded
areas with am, (Russia would however be reluctant no
dou
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