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Withdrawal
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} (1) Hong Kong's future must eventually lie in China.
likely to become an issue in the 1980s (when confidence and the economy must inevitably start to run down) or earlier if, in the meantime, Chinese pressures carry the indication that China has a serious intention to make our position untenable. But in present circumstances we need not indeed, we cannot contemplate action to this end. When we do decide to withdraw we will face major problems in the discharge of our obligations towards the Chinese section of the community (particularly those who are British subjects or who may be vulnerable to retaliation because of their loyalty to the British connection) in the maintenance of internal security during the period of withdrawal. The nature of these problems points to the need for some understanding with the Chinese. We can in any case put out of our minds any thought of an independent status for Hong We shall have to Kong, under U.N, auspices or otherwise. hand over sovereignty to China.
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A unilateral decision on our part to withdraw would be a course of last resort. This would invite Chinese harrassment: they would not acquiesce in our withdrawal at our own speed and in our own way and we could not prevent their interference.
We must avoid coming to any arrangement with the Chinese compromising our control over the administration of the Colony (i.e. a Macao-type situation) as a step towards ultimate withdrawal.
We should preferably offer to negotiate withdrawal, avoiding if at all possible any form of joint control of the administration of the Colony prior to handing over since this would give the Chinese an infinite capability for mischief and for frustrating our intentions.
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The Chinese response to our offer of negotiations would depend very much on whether it suited their policy and interests at the time to take the Colony oger and, of course, on the strength of our negotiating position. chances of a favourable response would be best if the Chinese were genuinely anxious, far economic reasons, to take Hong Kong over with minimum damage to the economy; our negotiating position would be strongest if we sought to withdraw when the Hong Kong economy was its normal buoyant self and there was no Chinese pressure.
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