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51.
Given adequate time and no Chinese interference, there should be no difficulty in providing facilities for those non-Chinese who Our problem wish to leave the Colony with their moveable assets. would lie in the discharge of our responsibilities to nearly two million Chinese who are British subjects and in particular to the 100-200,000 Chinese, both British subjects and aliens, who would be vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. We could not expect to obtain from the Chinese satisfactory guarantees for the future treatment of those (the vast majority) who would have to stay in Hong Kong. 52. Even the vulnerable category presents what seems to be an intractable problem. No countries have agreed to take Chinese in significant numbers; those that have taken them have required the Most possession of certain skills or professional qualifications. of the vulnerable category will have these but there may be some financially expensive resettlement costs.
53. There are about 35m000 Hong Kong Chinese in this country; could be considerable opposition to taking any more.
there
Taiwan would
America
no doubt in these circumstances take quite a large number. and Canada are countries with large Chinese communities that might take significant numbers. Some South American countries (e.g. Brazil) might offer special facilities. But we cannot talk to any of these countries (other, possibly, than America, Canada and Australia) in advance about this problem. The period of our withdrawal is likely to be measured in months and past experience (as evidenced by U.N. efforts on behalf of refugees) has shown that much longer than this will be necessary to negotiate permanent settlement opportunities. Temporary transit areas will therefore be necessary and we may find countries very reluctant to act as host to large numbers of Chinese
Singapore, who have no guarantee of permanent residence elsewhere. Taiwan, Manila and our Pacific dependencies may be possibilities. 54. The second major problem will be the maintenance of internal security. Public knowledge that we were preparing to withdraw would have an immediate and profound effect on the internal security situation. Those fearful of the change of regime would be clamouring to get out; communists would get to work on a confused public and rally their sympathisers whose numbers would mushroom overnight among those (the great majority) of the population who
they would be joined by would see no alternative but to remain;
The morale of the Police Force criminal and hooligan elements.
the would dip sharply (if it did not disintegrate altogether); Force is preponderantly Chinese and its members would understandably
The task of maintaining public be looking over their shoulders. order might devolve entirely on the garrison and the likelihood is that it will prove impossible to maintain control throughout the whole area of the Colony. This would undoubtedly be the case if the Chinese Government deliberately set out to foment the situation. These two major problems present us with a conflict in time
55. scales. We should nced as much time as we could get to discharge our responsibilities to people. But the difficulties we would face in circumstances of growing disorder and economic confusion indicate that the period of withdrawal should be as short as possible.
/ 56.
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