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and backing for Hong Kong from that source.
It will then be
necessary to increase the forces stationed in the Colony to ensure
Our that their effectiveness is not impaired or reduced. garrison will thereafter be at the end of a long line of communications and, although there will be no intrinsic problem in supplying it from the United Kingdom, its reinforcement would take a little longer than in present circumstances.
C. BRITISH RESPONSIBILITIES
Responsibilities to People
21.
(a)
20. We have cbligations to safeguard the welfare and interests of about half the population of Hong Kong, the remainder being aliens.
A clear obligation extends to the following categories:-
61,000 British subjects and Commonwealth citizens of non-Chinese race, of which about 30,000 at the present time are members of the armed forces and their families (the Gurkha troops and their dependents are included in this category).
22.
(b)
About half (or 1.9 million) of the Chinese population who have, or are entitled to claim the status of Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies.
In the event of our withdrawal, we would have a residual responsibility to see that non-Chinese foreign nationals (numbering about 11,000) have the opportunity to leave if they wish and if their own Governments fail to make arrangements for them. 23. It is arguable that we would also have a moral obligation to non-communist Chinese aliens: these would be regarded in the cycs of the Free World as refugees from Communism who should not be left to their fate. To some in this latter category our moral obligation is very strong and inescapable - namely, those who because of their close connection with our administration would be very vulnerable to Chinese retaliation (see paragraph 25 below). 24. There seems no likelihood that, in withdrawing from Hong Kong, we could effectively discharge all our responsibilities to the people, Those in category (a) of paragraph 21 will have an alternative place of residence; we shall need to provide facilities for them to leave with their assets and, in some cases possibly, to assist with their resettlement. is no prospect that we could evacuate or place numbers of Chinese involved in category (b). would have to be left to their fate. Large numbers would not wish to leave and would accommodate themselves to the new regime, but many would suffer. Our moral stock would fall grievously low if, in a voluntary withdrawal, we did not do all that we could either to secure an alternative place of residence for them cutside Hong Kong if they wanted to leave or some guarantees for
/their
But clearly there elsewhere the
The vast majority
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