TNAG-0043-FCO40-79-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1968 — Page 13

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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Desciers with F.E.D.

comply with a Chinese ultimatum on the treatment of

communist Press representatives in Hong Kong. Recent

exchanges with the Chinese indicate that members of the

British Mission and also possibly other British subjects

in China are being held as hostages by the Chinese in order

to secure concessions on Hong Kong, (it is just as likely, howeve

that they would similarly use our Mission, etc. to bring pressur

to bear on us for other ends).

Economic

5. Our exports to Hong Kong in 1967 were £62 million f.o.b.

(of the same order as our exports to Japan), a proportion of

which goes on to other markets through Hong Kong. If the

Hong Kong market was lost to us, we might save what we could

sell direct in the markets hitherto supplied through Hong Kong,

but clearly a lot of these frustrated exports would be

difficult to sell elsewhere at first.

6. Our imports from Hong Kong in 1967 were £89 million c.i.f.,

of which £34 million was in clothing and £18 million in textiles.

If these imports were totally stopped, there would be some

substitution, particularly from other Eastern suppliers,

of

all types of goods; in the case of textiles, which are subject

to quantitative control, such substitution could be regulated.

We derive some economic advantage in being able to obtain cheap

supplies from Hong Kong. Their loss might lead to a rise in

prices of certain goods in the United Kingdom but there would,

of course, be relief from the embarrassment (mainly political)

caused by the competition of Hong Kong exports with our textile

and certain light industries.

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